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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

DANIEL K. MILLIGAN,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

-vs.COCA COLA BOTTLING COMPANY
OF OGDEN, a corporation, and SAFEWAY STORES, INC., a corporation,

Case No. 9161

Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

PRELI~fiNARY

STATE1fENT

The parties will be referred to as in the Court below.
All italics are ours.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an appeal from an Order Granting Motion
for Summary Judgment in favor of defendant, Safeway
Stores, Inc., signed October 22, 1959 (R. 17), and a
Judgment of Non-Suit for Defendant, Coca Cola Bottling
Company of Ogden, signed on October 26, 1959 (R. 20).
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The Motions were made by respective counsel for both
defendants at pretrial of this law suit. Said Motions were
granted by the pretrial judge based on the pleadings and
the deposition of the plaintiff (R. 16).
The incident out of which this action arose, occurred
at plaintiff's home at 1373 Fifth Street, Ogden, Utah, at
approximately 8:30 o'clock P.M. on the 31st day of J\Iarch,
1959. At the time in question the plaintiff opened a bottle
of Coca Cola and while taking a drink from said bottle
a square paper clip came from said bottle and lodged
in his windpipe, thereby causing the damages of which
plaintiff complains (R. 1).
Plaintiff purchased the bottle in question at a store
of defendant, Safeway Stores, Inc., located on 24th Street,
above Monroe Avenue in Ogden, rtah, a few days prior to
February 27, 1959, when he purchased two cartons of
six bottles, these being the smaller size bottles (plaintiff's
deposition pp. 12-15). Said bottle had been manufactured
and prepared by defendant, Coca Cola Bottling Company
of Ogden, as alleged in plaintiff's Cmnplaint and as
shown by the Coc.a Cola bottle cap placed in evidence at
the deposition (R. 2 and Exhibit-± plaintiff's deposition).
Plaintiff testified in his deposition that the two
e.artons of Coca Cola were kept in a fruit room which
opens frorn the attached garage and is next to the kitchen.
II e further testified that the bottle in question ·was the
last of the two cartons. On the night in question, at approximately S :30 o~elork P.~L, he took a shower and prepared himself for bed and then opened the bottle in ques-
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3
tion and had drunk about half of it when the paper clip
lodged in his throat (plaintiff's Deposition pp. 8, 10, 11
and Exhibit 1). Plaintiff testified that whenever he and
his wife are both out of the house the garage door is kept
locked (plaintiff's Deposition p. 12). Plaintiff would
testify at trial, if given an opportunity, that when he
opened the bottle of Coca Cola it popped and fizzed.
After plaintiff was taken to the hospital, the bottle
rn (1uestion was exarnined and another paper clip was
found in the bottom (Exhibit 3 plaintiff's deposition).
In addition to this, plaintiff testified that x-rays taken
at the hospital showed a paper clip in his stomach (plaintiff's deposition p. 9). I-Ie also testified that an x-ray
.taken the next day shovved that the paper clip had entered
the big colon.
Plaintiff also testified that there were no such paper
clips as the clips in question around his house and that
he had no connection with any such clips in his business
(pp. 24 and 25 plaintiff's deposition). In addition to this
plaintiff testified that he used a combination beer can
bottle opener to open the bottle in question (p. 11 plaintiff's deposition). If given the opportunity, plaintiff
could produce the opener which was used and an examination of the opener together with the bottle cap in evidence
"·ould show that the indentation fits exactly. It can easily
hr seen frmn an examination of the bottle cap that there
:'ere no other n1arks than the one made by the bottle
opener.
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Plaintiff filed his Complaint against both the Coca
Cola Bottling Company of Ogden, the manufacturer, and
Safeway Stores, Inc., the retailer.
Three legal theories of recovery were alleged in the
Complaint against both defendants. Plaintiff alleged,
first, that both defendants violated the statutes of Utah,
Section 5, Chapter 20, Title 4, Utah Code Annotated,
1953 in manufacturing for sale and selling a bottle of
Coca Cola which was adulterated by having in it foreign
articles, to-wit: paper clips.
Next, plaintiff alleged that both defendants impliedly
warranted to plaintiff when plaintiff purchased the said
bottle of Coca Cola that said bottle of Coca Cola was fit
for the use intended and that it was of merchantable
quality; and further that both defendants breached said
implied warranty in that said bottle of Coca Cola was not
fit for the use intended and was not of Inerchantable
quality.
In addition to this, plaintiff alleged that both defendants were negligent and that an inference of negligence arises from the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur (R.
1, 2 and 3).
A Notice of Readiness was filed and pretrial was
held on October 21, 1959. Counsel for plaintiff was not
prPsent at this pretrial (nothing is clain1ed by reason
of this). At pretrial, both defendants Inade l\fotions for
Summary Judg1nent which were granted. When counsel
for plaintiff picked up his copy of the Pretrial OrdBr and
discovered that these Motions had been 1nade and grant-
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ed, he made inquiry from the pretrial judge as to the
reasons said Motions were granted. He was informed
generally that they were granted as to the negligence
issue on the basis of the Jordan case, the warranty issue
on the basis of the Sales Act and the statutory violation
issue on the basis of the Niemann case. From these Sulnmary Dismissals the plaintiff has filed this appeal.
Subsequent to the filing of the Notice of Appeal and
the Designation of Record on Appeal, defendant Safeway
Stores, Inc., filed a motion to attach to the record a
"·Continuing Cmnmodity Guaranty" for the reason that
this agreement was discussed at pretrial and through
oversight was not offered into evidence. The court allowed this agreen1ent between the two defendants to be
admitted in evidence and attached to the record, and
counsel for plaintiff stated his objection to this procedure
for the reason that any agreement between the two tortfeasors could not possibly affect the rights of an injured
party injured because of said defendants' negligence,
breach of warranty and statutory violation (R. 22 and
23).
STATE~IENT

OF POINTS RELIED UPON

POINT I.
BOTH DEFENDANTS ARE LIABLE TO PLAINTIFF
FOR BREACH OF IMPLIED WARRANTY.
POINT II.
AN INFERENCE OF NEGLIGENCE EXISTS AGAINST
BOTH DEFENDANTS UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF RES
IPSA LOQUITUR.
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POIN'T III.
BOTH DEFENDANTS ARE LIABLE TO PLAINTIFF
BY REASON OF VIOLATION OF ADULTERATION STATUTES.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
BOTH DEFENDANTS ARE LIABLE TO PLAINTIFF
FOR BREACH OF IMPLIED WARRANTY.
A.

FOUNDATION OF IMPLIED WARRANTY
1.

·COMMON LAW

The special obligation of warranty in the sale of food
arose at common law at an early date as an action on the
case and was a tort action in the nature of deceit. It has
been pointed out that this special obligation was in existence before the action of special assumpsit on which
1nodern contract law is based. It should be pointed out
that jurisdictions in the United States which do not have
the Uniform Sales Act allow actions on in1plied warranty
in food cases based on the old comn1on la·w. See Williston on Sales, \T ol. I, Sections :2±1 and :2-1::2 ; Decker and
Sons Inc. cs. Capps, et al., 1942, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.\V.
2d 8:2S; Parish v. Great AtlaJZtic & Pacific Tea Co., ~fun.
( ~t. 1958, 177 N.Y.S. 2d 7.
2.

SALES ACT

Jfost jurisdictions in the rnited States, as does rtah,
operate under the provisions of the Unifonn Sales Act.
Ln speaking of the origin of the Sales Act. Professor
Williston states in his work on sales, Yol. I. Paragraph
24R at Page 659 :
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"In the preceding sections nun1erous decision~
under the Sales Act have indicated its effect on
previously existing Common law, but a brief
sun1mary may still be pertinent.
"The provisions of the Sales Act on warranty
were copied in substance frmn the English statute and that statute was intended to express tlw
cmnmon law of England as it existed at the tinw
the act was passed. It rnay, therefore, be supposed
that the liability of a seller under the Sales Act
vvill be somewhat greater than that imposed by
the conrmon law of many jurisdictions of tht>
United States."
The part of the Sales Act which applies to the case
at bar is contained in Section G0-1-15, 1Jtah Code Annotated, 1953, and reads as follows:
"Irnplied warranties of quality. - Subject
to the provisions of this title and of any statute
in that behalf, there is no irnplied warranty or
condition as to the qualit:T or fitness for any particular purpose of goods supplied under a contract to sell or a sale, except as follows:
(1) \Vhere the buyer, expressly or by inrplication, rnakes known to the seller the particular
purpose for which the goods are required, and it
appears that the buyer relies on the seller's skill
or judgrnent (whether he is the grower or manufacturer or not), there is an implied warranty
that the goods shall be reasonably fit for such
purpose.
( 2) Where the goods are bought by description frorn a seller who deals in goods of that
description (whether he is the grower or manufacturer or not), there is an implied warranty that
the goods shall be of rnerchantable quality.''
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Generally speaking, food cases 1nerely refer to an
implied warranty of wholesomeness of food or words to
that effect without specifying whether the warranty
comes into operation under subdivision 1 or subdivision
2 of the aforesaid statute. This practice is summarized
by Reed Dickerson in his comprehensive work, "Products
LiabiliJty and the Food Consumer," 1951, in Paragraph
1.19 at Page 60:
"In practice, there is a strong tendency to
assume that Sections 15 (1) and 15 (2), taken
together, raise a warranty of wholesomeness in
all retail food sales. Whatever may be true of
other commodities, the jigsaw puzzle of the Uniform Sales Act, as pieced together in many states,
spells out in consumer food cases a liability in
warranty as strict as that existing under the special common law warranty peculiar to food."
And, as was pointed out by Justice Stephens in his
memorable decision in the case of Cushing v. Rodman,
OCA D.C. 1936, 82 F. 2d 86-± in footnote 1 at Page 864:
"In this case, w·e speak in terms of implied
warranty of wholesmneness. As pointed out in
Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, cit. infra,
there are tin1es ·when an ilnplied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose has no relation to an
implied warranty of nwrchantable quality; but in
the case of foods, the distinction between the two
warranties is unilnportant, for whether or not
there is an i1nplied warranty that the goods are
fit for the purpose of human consun1ption, there
is an ilnplied warranty that the~r are of merchantable quality; and food which is unfit for human
consumption does not satisfy this warranty."
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The situation existing in the ordinary retail sale as
held to be under subdivision 1 aforesaid has been well
stated in the case of Rinaldi v ..ZJ!I ohican Co., 225 N.Y. 70,
73, 121 N.E. 471, 472:
"We think that the mere purchase by a customer from a retail dealer in foods of an article
ordinarily used for human consumption does by
implication make known to the vendor the purpose for which the article is required. Such a
transaction standing by itself permits no contrary
inferences. In this we agree with the courts of
Massachusetts. But we think, further, that such a
purchase where the buyer may assume that the
seller has the opportunity to examine the article
sold, unexplained, is also conclusive evidence of
reliance on the seller's skill or judgment."
Also it is stated at Page 57 of Reed Dickerson's
"Products Liability and the Food Consumer":

"It is generally agreed that a purchase by
trade name is a purchase by description within the
meaning of Section 15 ( 2), which gives the buyer
the protection of the implied warranty of merchantability.''
Also see Mead v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 1952, 329
:Mass. 440, 108 N.E. 2d 757, where it was held that a purchase of Coca Cola from a vending machine was a sale
of goods by description and that there was no essential
difference in this method and in the method used in self
service stores and that there accordingly was an implied
warranty of merchantability under subsection 2 aforesaid. Furthermore, it appears that some states have imposed a warranty of wholesomeness on food products a::-:
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a 1natter of public policy separate and apart frmn the
Sales Act. In this regard, note particularly cases hereinafter cited from the states of Washington, Texas and
.:\1issouri.
B.

AS AGAINST RETAILER

The general state1nent of the law in regard to inlplied warranty liability as against a retailer dealing in
sealed goods is stated in Harper and James, ''The Law
of Torts," 1956, ·vol. 2 at Page 1599 as follows:
"The principal controversy concerning the
retailer's liability rages over the question whether
or not he warrants the fitness of products obtained from reputable suppliers and sold in their
containers under circumstances where the buyer
realizes that his seller could not and did not
inspect the contents of the container. Probably
the 1najority of American courts (both at common
law and under the Sales Act) now hold the
retailer strictly on his warranty. * * *
The argument for the prevailing view points
to the strict nature of warranty at common law
and under the broad tenns of the Sales Act,
\Vhich certainly do not suggest an exception for
latent defects. If reliance upon the seller is
needed, it 1nay be found in the customer's reliance
on the retailer's skill and judgment in selecting
his sources of supply. Broader considerations are
also urged. The retailer should bear this as one
of the risks of his enterprise. He profits from
the transaction and is in a fairly strategic position to promote safety through pressure on his
supplier. Also, he is known to his customers and
subject to their suits, while the 1naker is often
unknown and may well be beyond the process
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of any court convenient to the custmner. ~fore
over, the retailer is in a good position to pass
the loss back to his supplier, either through negotiation or through legal proceedings."
A silnilar statmnent is nmde as to the 1najority
point of view on this subject in "Prosser on, Torts" 2nd
l·:dition, 1955, at Page 495. For si1nilar staten1ents as
to the great weight of authority see 90 ALR 1270} 1272:
I I arper and ~T mnes "The Lew· of Torts" Y ol. 2, Page
1599; and 1-1::2 ALR 1439. Also see Burkhardt v. Armo·ur
& Co., 1932, 115 ·Conn. 2-±9, 1G1 A. 385; Swengel v. F. &
E. lVlwlesale Grocery Co.} 1938, 147 Kan. 555, 77 P. 2d
930; Food P.air Stores of Florida v. Macurda} 1957, _______ _
Fla. ______ , 93 So. 2d fHiO; Sence'r 1'. Carl's JY/arkets} 1950:
______ Fla. ______ , 45 So. 2d 671; Griggs Canning Co.} et al L
Josey} 1942, 139 T~x. 623, 16-t S.vV. 835; and 1 "TVillistrm
o H Sales" Page 637.
In addition to this, the following cases, led by'Cttshll:Jdnuw} CCA D. C. 1936, 82 F. 2d 864, have ilnposed irnplied warranty liabilit:v on restaurant operator~
wg

'l'.

\\·ho serve food \Yhich cannot be inspected without eating
and thereby destroying the rnarketability of said food in
spite of the technical argurnent made by defendants that
the service of food is not technically a sale: Stanfield

L

F. H'". T:Vool'lcorth Co.} 1936, 143 Kan. 117, 53 P. 2d 878:
Smith r. Carlos} 1923, 215 ~1o. App. 488, 247 S.W. 468:

Friend r. Cl1ilds Dinhlg flall Co.} 1918, 231 Mass. 65, 120
::~.E.

-1-01: and Temple r. ]{peler, 192-t 2:1R N.Y. 3++, 14+

S.E. 635.
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In particular the policy statement made in the case
of Cushing v. Rodman, supra, is recommended to this
court as a persuasive statement of the policy reasons
for imposing an implied warranty on a person in the
same position as a retailer.
Another statement is made in Harper and James,
((The Law of Torts," supra, Vol. 2 at Page 1582 which
appears to cover specifically the situation involved in
self service stores :
"Thus, in the everyday situation where the
customer selects foodstuffs on display in a selfservice supermarket, the weight of authority will
impose a warranty of fitness whether the product
is sealed in a can or is open to inspection * * *."
C.

AS AGAINST MANUFACTURER

The primary problem involved in attaching liability
to the manufacturer is the claim made by the manufacturer that there is no privity of contract between
the manufacturer and the consumer and, therefore,
there can be no implied warranty. ~~s will be seen hereafter, there is no historical foundation for this claim and
there is no sound reason for upholding it. There is a
growing modern trend of cases which have discarded
the old privity doctrine by one method or another as
will be seen hereafter. Some cases have in1posed the
warranty on a public policy basis; others have held that
the warranty runs with the product; others have held
that there is privity; while still others have skirted the
privity rule by use of the third party beneficiary con-
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cept. There are other cases which have apparently
ignored or brushed aside the privity concept.
A good statement of policy as to why, in the public
interest, warranties should be extended is stated in
l-Iarper and Jan1es, "The Law of Torts," 1956, Vol. 2
at Page 1571:
"But where commodities are dangerous to
life and health, society's interest transcends that
of protecting reasonable business expectations. It
extends to minimizing the danger to consumers
and putting the burden of their losses on those
·who best can minimize the danger and distribute
equitably the losses that do occur. And since the
warranties involved in these cases do not represent the expressed or implied-in-fact intent of
bargainers, but are warranties imposed by law
as vehicles of social policy, (citing cases), the
courts should extend them as far as the relevant
social policy requires. The interest in consumer
protection calls for warranties by the maker that
do run with the goods, to reach all who are likely
to be hurt by the use of the unfit commodity for
a purpose ordinarily to be expected.
Several courts have accepted reasoning substantially like that just set out, although very few
of the decisions that do so deal with commodities
other than food. Thus the warranty remedy
against the maker has been extended to remote
purchasers and to consumers other than purchasers. (citing cases)"
One of the leading cases in this field is the case of
Decker & Sons, Inc. v. Capps, et al, 1942, 139 Tex. 609
164 S.\Y. 2d 828. This ·was a law suit for injuries arising
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out of consumption of sausage manufactured by the
defendant and sold to a retail dealer in a cellophane
package. In discarding the claim of lack of privity as
a defense, the court imposed an implied warranty by
operation of law as a matter of "public policy." In reviewing the common law the court pointed out that
the warranty applying to food products arose before
special assumpsit on which modern contracts law is
based and that the re1nedy for impure food was an
action on the case. The court went on to point out that
the doctrine of privity of contract grew out of special
assumpsit and therefore there was no historical reason
for imposing the privity doctrine on food products cases.
The court went on to hold that regardless of the privity
doctrine having no historical basis the court was holding
that there is an i1nplied warranty on food products as
a Inatter of public policy for the protection of the public
and that this warranty is not dependent on any provision of the contract, either expressed or in1plied. The
court cited nu1nerous cases showing the growing tendency to discard the requiren1ent of privity and to hold
the manufacturer liable directly to the ultin1ate consumer.
The case of PariJsh v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea
Co., Th1:un. Ct. N. Y. 1958, 177 N.Y.S. 2d 7, is a case
in which an exhaustive study was 1nade by the judge
in regard to the question of privity. The question in-

volved in that case was whether or not a child could
recover inas1nuch as the child's 1nother was the purchaser of the food in question and the one who had
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privity. Of course, if the privity doctrine is logically
applied, there are a great many situations which can
be foreseen where a child or a husband or a friend could
he denied recovery on this technicality. The scholarly
opinion of the judge in the Parish case held that there
\Yas no historical basis for the privity doctrine in the
food field and that public policy was to protect the
eonsuming public. and that there was no reason to
distinguish betv{een a buyer and any other consu1ner.
rPhe court in ruling in favor of the plaintiff brushed aside
the privit~, concept on the basis of the third part:v beneficiary concept.
~Che case of Crystal Coca Cola Bottling Co. v.
Cothey, 1957, 83 Ariz. 163, 317 P. 2d 1094, is a law su1t
whic~1 \Yas brought both on implied warranty and res
ipsa loquitur in a case ·w·here a dead fly was found in
a bottle of Coca Cola purchased and consumed at a
drug store. The law suit was filed against the manufacturer, and the court held that both theories were
1naintainable in Arizona. The contention was made in
that case that there could be no recovery on implied
warranty because of lack of privity. The court rejected
this contention citing a modern trend of cases which
have rejected the privity doctrine as unsound and rel~·ing especially on the Capps case, supra. The court
states at Page 1097:

"However, an i1nposing group of jurisdictions hold that there is an exception to the general
rule in the case of manufacturers of food stuffs
such that an in1plied warranty of fitness inures
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to the benefit of the ultimate consumer though
there be no strict privity of contract running
between the manufacturer and consumer. (citing
cases) * * *
We believe that the decisions in the latter
group of jurisdictions represent the more recent
trend and provide the better reasoned authority.''
The case of Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co., 1939, 14
Cal. 2d 272, 93 P. 2d 799, is a case in which the court
exploded the privity doctrine as contended for by the
defendant. That case involved a sandwich made by the
defendant which contained maggots. The defendant company made the sandwich in question and wrapped it
in waxed paper which was sealed by metal clips and
sold to the retailer.
In reply to the claim of lack of privity, the court
stated at Page 804:
"In adopting the statute here concerned as
a part of the Uniform Sales _._~ct, it was the clear
intent of the legislature that, with respect to
foodstuffs, the implied warranty provision therein contained should inure to the benefit of any
ultimate purchaser or consu1ner of food, and that
it was not intended that a strict "privity of contract" would be essential for the bringing of an
action by such ultilnate consun1er for an asserted
breach of the implied "'\Varranty.
"Although authorities to the contrary of the
conclusions herein reached have in1posed a strict
privity of contract on a purchaser or consumer
of assertedly unwholesmne food as an essential
requisite for the bringing of an action on the
implied warranty theory, nevertheless, the rulings
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made in the authorities herein cited are based on
sound principles, affording as they do an adequate remedy for injuries which may result from
the eating of unwholesome food by an ultimte
consumer who, under modern economic conditions, almost of necessity, must purchase many
items of food prepared in original packages by
the 1nanufacturer and intended for the consuming
public, although marketed through an intermediate dealer.''
In reaching this conclusion the court cited numerous
authorities.
The case of Cernes v. Pittsburgh Coca Cola Bottling
Co., Dec. 6, 1958, 183 Kan. 758, 332 P. 2d 258, is the
end product of a number of decisions in Kansas which
have done away ·with any kind of privity requirement
on the si1nple basis of public policy. This case involved
drinking part of a bottle of Coca Cola containing a
foreign substance. The court stated in part, in referring
to the liability of the n1anufacturer:
"Where he places such bottled beverage in
the hands of a dealer for sale, the manufacturer
is responsible for damages to the consumer, who
procures such beverage from the dealer and is
injured by partaking of it. * * *
The basis for imposing this liability is a
n1atter of public policy for the protection of the
people, as discussed in many of our cases. (citing
cases)"
Also see Sharp v. The Pittsburgh Coca Cola Bottl-ing
Co., 1957, 180 Kan. 845, 308 P. 2d 150; Simmons v. W~chi
ta Coca Cola Bottling Co., 1957, 181 Kan. 35, 309 P.2d
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633; and Nichols v. Nold, 1953, 174 Kan. G13, 258 P.
2d 317.
The case of LaHue v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., Inc.,
1957, ________ Wash. ________ , 314 P. 2d 421, is a case where
the court swept aside the claimed defense of lack of
privity by holding that the implied warranty of the
wholesomeness of food or beverages in original packages
placed on sale arises as an implication of the common
law and that the liability does not rest so rnuch upon
an irnplied contract as upon a violation of the duty to
rnernbers of the general public to prevent them from
suffering injury as a result of the wrongful manufacture
or distribution of any particular article or articles. The
court cited the prior Washington case of Mazetti v.
Armour & Co., 1913, 75 \Vash. 622, 135 P. 633.
The case of Coca Cola Bottling lVorks v. Lyons,
1927, 145 Miss. 876, 111 So. 305, dealt with the privity
question by holding that the irnplied warranty runs with
the title of the product.
The Pennsylvania case of N o·ck r. Coca Cola Bottling
W arks of P-ittsburgh, 1931, 102 Pa. Super. 515, 156 ~\.
537, held that when the product is sold in the original
package, there is privity behveen the rnanufacturer and
the consumer; and that staternent which appears in
many of the cases in this field appears in a Missouri
case, W~lliams v. Coca Cola Bottlimg Co., 1955, ________ Mo.
··-·----, 285 S.W. 2d 53: at Page 5G:
"\Ve affirrn the established rule that a manufacturer is absolutely liable to the ulthnate con-
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sumer for injuries resulting from the consumption
of Coca Cola containing i1npure, foreign or deleterious substances upon the theory of breech of
implied warranty of fitness for the purpose of
human consumption. * * *
The consumer's remedy should not be made
to depend upon the "intricacies of the law of
::;ales," the doctrine of privity of contract, or the
proof of negligence, nor is this type of case one
for the application of the co1nmon law doctrine
of caveat emptor. * * *
Considerations of public policy, 1nodern
methods of 1nanufacturing, packaging and merchandising and the protection of the health of
the consuming public require that an obligation
be placed upon the 1nanufacturer of Coca Cola
to see to it, at his peril, that the product he
offers the public is fit for the purpose for which
it is intended, namely, human consumption. The
·'de1nands of social justice" require that his liability should be made absolute.''
lt is sub1nitted that the foregoing authorities are
representative of the modern trend in establishing absolute liability upon the manufacturer for injuries caused
by in1pnre food or drink. After all, he is the one who
is making the profit and who has the ability to take
~teps to avoid n1arketing bad food products. The consuming public, of necessity, must and has to rely on
the manufacturer to furnish then1 pure food. Certainly,
all sound reasons of public policy demand that this
absolute liability be imposed upon the manufacturer
of foods.
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POINT II.
AN INFERENCE OF NEGLIGENCE EXISTS AGAINST
BOTH DEFENDANTS UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF RES
IPSA LOQUITUR.

Under this point, it is earnestly urged that this court
reappraise the case of Jordan v. Coca Cola Bottling
Co. of Utah, 1950, 117 U. 578, 218 P. 2d 660. It is submitted that a reappraisal will show that this case should
be overruled and the law of Utah brought into line ''Tith
the majority of authority throughout the country in food
products liability cases. It is respectfully submitted that
the opinion in the Jordan case is based upon a fanciful
speculation that there are jokers at large in the cmnmunity going around and tampering with Coca Cola bottles
at every opportunity. Furthermore, the opinion in the
Jordan case appears to be based on a false requirement
that the Coca Cola Bottling Company have exclusive
control of the bottle at the time the bottle is consumed
and the deleterious substance discovered. As has been
pointed out in cases which \Vill be cited herein, the
requirement of exclusive control is that the bottling
company have exclusive control at the time the deleteri01l.'3 substance is introd1tced into said bottle. Of course,
this should be a question for the jury to decide, based
on all the evidence surrounding the incident.
The opinion in the Jordan case, supra. placed Utah
behind, in the general trend throughout the county in
contaminated food and beverage cases. to\vards a relaxation of the require1nent of exclusiYe control. See
/J Utah Lau: Reriezc. 116. This court appeared to follow

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

21
this trend in the later non food case of Moore v. James,
1956, 5 U. 2d 91, 297 P 221, where an innkeeper was
held to have exclusive control of the bathtub and supporting legs while being used by a guest.
If, based on the evidence, the jury decides that there
has been no tampering, then certainly the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur should apply. For the court to rule
out res ipsa loquitur as a matter of law is, in essence,
the court deciding the issue on a "possibility." This
court has ruled in the ease of Moore v. D. & R. G. W.,
1956, -! U. 2d 255, 292 P. 2d 849, that "possibilities"
cannot be given to the jury.
In the case at bar, as has been pointed out in the
statement of facts herein, credible evidence could and
would be introduced to make a prima facie showing
that there had been no tampering with the bottle in
question. The plaintiff in the case at bar would testify,
given an opportunity, that the bottle was hard to open
and that when opened, it popped and fizzed. Also, the
mere examination of the bottle cap would show that
there are no other 1narks other than the one which fits
exactly the bottle opener which was used. Certainly,
the mere fact that the bottle was kept in plaintiff's
fruit room and that, conceivably a burglar could burglarize plaintiff's home and do nothing except either exchange the bottle for another one or tamper with the
one which was there, should not prevent the jury from
taking a common sense approach to the evidence in
the case.
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The case of Crystal Coca Cola Bottling Co. L
Cathey, 1957, 83 Ariz. 163, 317 P. 2d 1094, appears to
be squarely in point as to this issue. In regard to the
res ipsa loquitur allegation, dealing ·with a situation
where the plaintiff purchased a bottle of Coca Cola in
a drug store and found a dead fly in the bottle and
was suing the bottling company, the court referred to
the four classifications set forth in the case of Coca
Cola Bottling Works v. Sullivan, 178 Tenn. 405, 15~
S.W. 2d 721. These are the same four classification~
which this court referred to in the Jordan case in
citing the Sullivan case.
In referring to the fourth classification where the
article passes through intennediate hands, the court
stated at page 1098:
"In adopting this classification we expand it
in one respect. We hold that in this fourth clas,;;
of case in order to satisfy the exclusive control
requisite of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine the
plaintiff 1nust either prove ''that there has been
no reasonable opportunity for tmnpering'' or
that there \\'as no ta1npering "with the bottle, or
it contents, in the interin1 betw·een the physical
control of the bottler or manufacturer, and that
of the consmner.'' r.-Chis is a question of fact which
the plaintiff 1nay prove by circtunstantial evidence for subn1ission to the jury under proper
instructions. In the instant ease the court instructed the jury that in order for the res ipsa
loquitur doctrine to apply, they nn1st determine
that the fly did not get into the bottle as a result
of the intervening act of a third part:, and that
the condition of the bottle ·wa8 the smne when it
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left the defendant bottling company's control as
when it was received by the plaintiff. We believe
that the jury might reasonably have decided that
under the circumstances there was no tampering
with the bottle after it left the bottler's control.
To decide that there was a tan1pering would require the jury to believe in this case that a
person would go unobserved to the cooler behind
the counter in a drugstore or the druggist or
one of his employees would go to the cooler and
place therein a bottle of Coca Cola in which he
had put a fly by removing and replacing the cap
and this without being able to foretell who might
be served that bottle or when it might be served.
This, we submit, is too far-fetched for reasonable
men to consider seriously. .; . * * The trial judge
placed the question of whether res ipsa loquitur
doctrine applied properly before the jury on
c.ircumstantial evidence which might well justify
a finding by the jury that it did apply."
There ·was a sin1ilar holding in the case of Rutherford r. Huntington Coca Cola Bottling Co., 1957, _______ _
\V. Va. ________ , 97 S.E. 2d 803. In this case the action was
for injuries caused by glass in a bottle of Coca Cola
which plaintiff obtained from a vending machine. The
eourt held that res ipsa loquitur was proper in this
ease and stated at Page 809:
"There is no evidence in this case from which
the jury could conclude that it was more likely
that smne evilly disposed person took the cap
off the bottle of Coca Cola, from which the plaintiff later drank, inserted some small particles
of glass therein, and carefully replaced the cap
while the bottle sat near the vending machine,
than that such procedure could have been effected
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after the bottles passed the final inspection at
the defendant's plant, and before they were delivered to the Borden Co. Of course, it is possible
that the plaintiff herself inserted the glass into
the bottle after she uncapped it for the purpose
of attempting to recover damages from the defendant. However, in reviewing hundreds of cases
where the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has been
applied in sealed package and bottle beverage
cases, none has been found \Vhere it was not held
that it was a question for the jury as to whether
the plaintiff was the culprit. * * * A comprehensive review of the cases in other jurisdiction'
upon this question indicates that the views herein
expressed represent the great weight of authority, although there are eases to the contrary."
Another case which deals Vi-"'ith sin1ilar principles
is the case of Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno,
1944, 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P. 2d 436. Tlris case involved
a suit for injuries resulting from an exploding bottle
of Coca Cola received by a waitress. The plaintiff produced evidence of the normal handling of bottles and
that the bottle in question had been received at least
36 hours before the accident. The court held that res
ipsa loquitur was applicable stating at Page ±38:
"l\[an~? authorities state that the happening
of the accident does not speak for itself where
it took place smne tune after defendant had relinquished control of the instrmnentality causing
the injurr. Under the n1ore logical \"'iew. however, the doctrine nw~- be applied upon the theory
that defendant had control at the time of the alle.qcd ne.qligent act, although not at the time of
the' accidPnt. provided plaintiff first proves that
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the condition of the instrumentality had not been
changed after it left the defendant's possession.**
It is not necessary, of course, that plaintiff
elemina te every remote possibility of injury to
the bottle after defendant lost control, and the
requirmnent is satisfied if there is evidence permitting a reasonable inference that it was not
accessible to extraneous harmful forces and that
it was carefully handled by plaintiff or any third
person who may have moved or touched it. * * *
If such evidence is presented, the question becomes one for the trier of fact, * * *, and, accordingly, the issue should be submitted to the
jury under proper instructions."
A good example of the type of evidence produced to
make a proper showing is found in the case of Gordon
v. A.ztec Brewing Co., 1949, 33 Cal. 2d 514, 203 P. 2d
522. This case involved an exploding bottle of beer.
The court in reviewing the evidence stated at Page 524:
"Tracing the case containing the bottle which
exploded from the defendant's plant to his hand
the plaintiff introduced evidence to the effect
that it suffered no damage at any stage of its
transportation. The course of cases of ABC beer
in August of 1944 when the aecident occurred was
as follows: The cases were loaded on trucks of
the LaSalle Trucking Company at the defendant's San Diego Plant; LaSalle drivers delivered
them to a warehouse of the Associated Brewers
Distributing Company in Los Angeles where they
remained about three days; on August 22 the
case which contained the bottle that exploded
was delivered by an Associated driver to the
plaintiff. Evidence was presented which showed
that LaSalle trucks were not involved in accidents
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during August, 1944; that no accidents occurred
in the Associated warehouse that month which
might have affected the beer; that the driver
who delivered the case to the plaintiff was not
involved in an accident en route and did not
bump the case; that it was in excellent condition
on delivery, and that the plaintiff handled the
case and the bottle carefully. While this evidencP
was not conclusive it was the jury's province to
determine, after being properly instructed.
whether the plaintiff had sufficiently proved the
absence of intervening harmful forces after the
defendant shipped the bottle to entitle the plaintiff to rely on an inference inherent in the do(·trine that the defendant's lack of care was the
proxinmte cause of his injury.'·'
For an exploding bottle case holding both res ipsn
loquitur and ilnplied ·warranty proper see n7iclwls 1".
Nold, 1953, 174 Kan. 613, 258 P. 2d 317. For other
exploding bottle cases allmving res ipsa loquitur set·
!Jfayuach ~·. Falstaff Breu:ing CorJJ .. 1949, ________ 2\lo.
________ , 222 S.\Y. 2d 87; Groves r. Florida Coca Cola Bottlimg Co., 1949, ________ Fla. --------· 40 So. 2d 1:28; Honea r.
Coca Cola BottUng Co., 19-±4, 143 Tex. :27:2. 183 S.\Y.
2d 968; Smitl1 ·r. Coca Cola Bottlinp Co .. 193:2, 91 X. 1-1.
522, 92 A. 2d 658: Loch v. Confair_. H)33. 3:22 Pa. :n~.
93 A. 2d ±51; Bornstein c. llfetropolitan BottHng Co ..

1!)57, -!5

~ ..T.

Super. :-W.\

1~1:.2

A. :2d 8:25: Dr. PepjJf-'r Bott-

eo.

of XCirporf L lrhidden, 1956~ -------- Ark --------·
~!)(; N.\r. ~d -tt2: and Coca Cola Bolf:ling Co. of SoHfh-

lill_rf

ensf Arkan . .·as 'l'. Jou('s,

~d :~~1. It lw~ been

1956, -------- Ark. ________ , :293 S.\Y.

stated generally in regard to food
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products cases at Page 122 in Reed Dickerson, "Products
Liability and the Food Consumer" 1952:
''It is plain from the reported cases that on
evidence tending to show causation, without more,
the plaintiff is entitled at least to go to the jury
on the issue of negligence. Some courts go farther
and recognize a presumption of negligence in the
plaintiff's favor, without, however, shifting the
burden of proof. Others recognize a presumption and place the burden of proof on the defendant to show that he was careful. * * * In
each of the categories described, courts can be
found acting under the auspices of res ipsa
loquitur."
There have been other cases where an inference
of negligence has been allowed without calling it by the
name of res ipsa loquitur. See Klein v. Duchess Sandlcich Co., 1939, 14 Cal. 2d 272, 93 P. 2d 799 and N ock
r. Coca Cola Bottlting Works of Pittsburgh, 1931, 102
Pd. Super. 515, 156 A. 537.
POINT III.
BOTH DEFENDANTS ARE LIABLE TO PLAINTIFF
BY REASON OF VIOLATION OF ADULTERATION STATUTES.

In Paragraph 6 of his Complaint, plaintiff alleged
that both defendants violated the statutes of Utah in
that defendant, Coca Cola Bottling Company, manufactured for sale and sold, and defendant, Safeway
Stores, Inc., sold, a bottle of Coca Cola which was
adulterated by having in it foreign articles, to-wit:
paper clips (R 2).
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It is noted that in 1957, the Utah Legislature enacted a Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, being codified as
Title 4, Chapter 26. It is noted that the pertinent adulteration statutes which were formely contained in Chapter 20 of Title 4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, were
re-enacted in substance in the Food, Drug and Cosmetic
Act. The pertinent sections in this act are as follows:
"4-26-3. Prohibited acts. - The following
acts and the causing thereof within the state of
Utah are prohibited:
1. The manufacture, sale, or delivery, holding or offering for sale of any food, drug, device,
or cosmetic that is adulterated or misbranded.

2. The adulteration or misbranding of any
food, drug, device, or cosmetic.
3. The receipt in con1merce of any food,
drug, device, or cosrnetic that is adulterated or
misbranded, and the delivery or proffered delivery thereof for pay or othenvise. * * *"
"4-26-5. Violation-:Misdemeanor-Defenses
-Dissemination of advertising.-1. Any person
who violates any of the provisions of section
4-26-3 shall be guilty of a misden1eanor.
2. No person shall be subject to the penalties of subsection 1 of this section. for having
violated subsections 1 or 3 of section 4-26-3 if he
establishes a guaranty or undertaking signed by,
and containing the nmne and address of, the
person residing in the state of Utah frmn whom
he received in good faith the article, to the effect
that such article is not adulterated or rnisbranded
within the rneaning of this act, designating thi~
aet. * * *"
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"4-26-2.
this act:

Definitions.-For the purpose of

* * * 3. The term "food" means (1) articles
used for food or drink for man or other animals,
(2) chewing gum, and (3) articles used for components of any such article. * * *"
"4-26-10. Food-When deemed adulterated.
-A food shall be deemed to be adulterated:
1. (1) If it bears or contains any poisonous nr d ... leterious substance which may render it
injurious to health; * * * (3) if it consists in
whole or in part of a diseased, contaminated, filthy, putrid, or decomposed substance, or if it is
otherwise unfit for food; * * *.
2. * * * (4) if any substance has been
added thereto or mixed or packed therewith so as
to increase its bulk or weight, or reduce its
quality or strength or make it appear better or
of greater value than it is. * * *"
There should be no question that paper clips in a
bottle of Coca Cola render the bottle of Coca Cola
adulterated within the aforesaid statutes. Certainly it
cannot be argued that said items in a bottle of Coca
Cola are not foreign added substances and not deleterious and harmful. If defendants make an issue of this
in their briefs then plaintiff will furnish additional
authorities to the court to substantiate this proposition.
The recent Utah case of Niem.ann v. Grand Central
Jfarket, Inc., decided by this court on April 3, 1959,
and found at 9 U. 2d 46, 337 P. 2d 424, should solve
the contention made on this point. In that case, this
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court held that a violation of the adulteration statute~
of Utah creates absolute liability for damage caused by
the sale of such food. There can be no question but that
both defendants come within the terms of the statutes
in manufacturing and selling the adulterated Coca Cola
bottle in question.
From the allegations of plaintiff's Complaint and
the evidence that plaintiff could offer, certainly a jury
could find that the bottle of Coca Cola contained the
paper clips in question while in the possession of both
defendants. This court well stated the purpose of the
statutes in question when it stated at Page 428 in the
Niemann case :
"The purpose of the statute in question i~
clearly the. protection of the public health and
safety. The accmnplislnnent of that purpose i~
of pri1ne ilnportance and n1ust be vigorously
chan1pioned. The high degree of danger and
serious consequences latent in the distribution of
food to the public require the ilnposition of the
duty anwunting to the creation of the strictest
liability. Those who undertake such distribution
1nust be responsible for all dmnage proximately
caused by the adulteration of their products.''
This court cited, as representative of the intent of
such :::;tatnt0s. the case of Hoefler L .~.Uickle, IS Or. 399.
] [);~ P. 417. which characterized the statute in question
as a remedial statute as follows at Page ±20:
"The statute is re1nedial in its nature, and
should be construed to effectuate tlw purpose
intended."
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lt is anticipated that the only possible defense which
(•ould be asserted by either of the defendants is the
asserted defense arising fro1n the Continuing Commodity
Guaranty which defendant, Safeway Stores, Inc., had
added to the record as Exhibit "A". Apparently, the
assertion will be made by Safeway Stores, Inc. that the
provisions of 4-26-5 Utah Code Annotated will relieve
said defendant from civil liability as well as criminal
liabiilty imposed by the adulteration statutes. It will
he noted that all said statute purports to do is to relieve a violator from criminal punishment. It is submitted that Section 4-26-3, Utah Code Annotated in
strict language prohibits the sale of adulterated food.
In the light of the purpose of these statutes, together
with the fact that these statutes are remedial and are
for the protection of the public, it is submitted that the
fact that Safeway &;res has o"l&ined such an agreement
fr01n the bottling company cannot obviate the command
of the statute and affect the rights of innocent members
of the public purchasing such adulterated articles.

There is a line of cases dealing with si1nilar contentions w·here it has been held that whether or not the violator could be punished under the penal provisions of
the statute was i1nmaterial as to the enforcement of the
rights given to members of the public by said statutes.
The general theory behind this reasoning is the fact that
duty and right are correlative terms, and where a duty
is imposed, there must be a right to have it performed.
The case of CUnkscales, et al v. Carver, 1943, 22 Cal.
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2d 72, 136 P. 2d 777, was a death action resulting from
an intersection collision. In that case there was a stop
sign involved which had been erected without official
authorization. Defendant did not stop at the stop sign.
The trial court instructed the jury to the effect that if
defendant failed to stop at this sign and the failure was
the proximate cause of the accident, the verdict should be
for the plaintiff. The Supreme Court held that this was
proper in the face of the contention made by defendant
that there could be no criminal responsibility for a person failing to stop at this sign and stated at Page 778:
I

"Even if the conduct cannot be punished
criminally because of irregularities in the adoption of the prohibitory provisions, the legislative
standard may nevertheless appl:T if it is an appropriate measure for the defendant's conduct.
When the court accepts the standard it rules in
effect that defendant's conduct falls below that
of a reasonable man as the court conceives it.
It does no more than it does in any ruling that certain acts or omissions a1nount as a matter of law to
negligence. Restatement: Torts, sec. 285. * * *
Failure to observe a stop-sign is unreasonably
dangerous conduct whether or not the driver is
in1mune frmn cri1ninal prosecution because of
so1ne irregularity in the erection of the stop-sign.''
The California eourt cited the \Yashington case of
Comfort -c. Penner, 166 \Yash. 171. 6 P. ~d 60-±.
The ea~e of Pouca City v. Reed, 115 Okla. 166, 2-1:2
P. 1G4, was a wrongful death aetion arising from the
electroeution of decedent ·while working for the city as
an el<"etrieian. The plaintiff alleged that the city was
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negligent in failing to furnish a safe place to work and
introduced into evidence city ordinances establishing
regulations for the heighth of wire above buildings and
so forth. The appellate court held that, although thl3
criminal penalty was unenforceable, the ordinance was
admissable to show that the city had declared rules of
safety for its inhabitants in general and that it had
failed to comply with these rules at the place where decedent was required to work.
Another case dealing with the same general problem
is the case of West Texas Coaches Inc. v. Madi, Tex.
Comm. App. 1930, 26 S.W. 2d 199. This case arose from
an automobile accident. One of the issues submitted to
the jury was whether or not the defendant drove at such
a speed as to endanger the life of persons on the highway. This issue was answered "yes" by the jury, and.
on appeal, the defendant complained that this issue was
presented in the language of a penal statute which was
vague and unenforceable. The court held that the statute,
so far as it imposes a rule on civil conduct, is not void
for uncertainty, citing the case of Solan & Billings v.
Pasche, Texas, 153 S.W. 672, where the court instructed
that the violation of the statute in question was negligence per se. The court stated at Page 674 in the Pasche
case:
"It is objected that the section of the law
quoted is unconstitutional and cannot be enforced
as a penal statute, because it is so vague and indefinite that it is not susceptible of enforcement
as such. It is unnecessary to determine whether
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or not the statute is subject to the particular objection urged, as it was at least sufficient as a
remedial statttte imposing a civil duty so as to
render its violation negligence per se."
The court also cited 42 C.J. 631 and Stri'Ckland
ley, Ga., 83 S.E. 856.

'V.

Whal-

An early New York case dealt with the same problem
in regard to an ordinance requiring fire escapes. Thi:-:
was found in the case of Willy, Adm. 'l". Mulledy, Court of
Appeals, N.Y. 1879, 78 N.Y. 310, 34 Am. Rep. 536. Thi~
was a death action caused by alleged negligence of defendant in failing to furnish a fire escape for an apartment which defendant rented to plaintiff. The Charter of
Brooklyn iinposed an absolute duty on owners of tenement houses to provide fire escapes. The Charter also
provided that persons failing to erect such fire escapes
after being notified by commissioners shall be guity
of a n1isderneanor. The defendant elaiined, ainong other
things, that he had never been notified by the ~commis
sioners. The court held that the defendant was not perrnitted to wait until notified~ that the breach of thll
statute gave rise to a civil cause of action.
At Page 314 the court stated:
"Duty and right are correlative~ and where a
duty is iinposed, there n1ust be a right to have it
performed."
Other ca~r~ in which the smue general problem ha~
hrrn dealt with similarly are: llopki·Jl$ r. Droppers, 192·:1:.
1S-~ \Vi~. 4-00, 19S K.\Y. '/i)S, where the rourt held a
father respon:.; ihle for lwing negligent a~ n matter of

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

35
law for allowing his son, who was under the age of 16
years, to drive a motorcycle, where the statute in question
merely imposed the penalty on the boy under 16 years of
age and imposed no penalty on the father; and Lewvs v.
City of Miami, 1937, 127 Fla. 426, 173 So. 150, where
a municipality was held responsible in negligence for
failing to segregate prisoners in the city jail and in allowing plaintiff to be exposed to a venereal disease. The
court in this case did not attempt to overrule the doctrine
of governmental immunity but based its ruling on the
violation of the statute dealing with protecting individuals from exposure to loathesome diseases.

It is submitted that the foregoing authorities clearly establish that such statutes as the ones in question
in this case have both civil and criminal sanctions. The
mere fact that for some reason the criminal punishment
cannot be imposed certainly does not and should not
relieve a person from complying with the commands of
the statutes in regard to the protection of the public at
large.

CONCLUSION
The issue in this appeal boils down to the simple
proposition of whether or not the buying public will be
protected for injuries resulting from purchasing adulterated food or drink. The buying public must, of necessity,
rely on the manufacturers and retailers for furnishing
wholesome food, and, in this regard, the buying public
is at the mercy of the persons who are making profits
from selling such food and drink. This court is well
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aware of the public policy which demands that such

pro~

tection be afforded, as was well stated in its opinion in
the Niemann case. It is submitted that the case at bar
is a typical case arising from the purchase of a sealed
bottle or can and injury resulting from adulterated food
therein.
The plaintiff's evidence can well justify a finding by
the jury that the paper clips were in the Coca Cola bottle
when he purchased it from defendant, Safeway Stores,
Inc., and that the paper clips were in the bottle \Yhile in
the possession and control of defendant, Coca Cola Bottling Company. In such a situation the rights of the
parties should be spelled out and made clear so that all
parties are made aware of their rights and duties. The
action in question was brought on the grounds of breach
of in1plied warranty, res ipsa loquitur and breach of
statutory duty in order to present all possible theories
to the court. Inasn1uch as this is the first tune in this
state that all possible theories have been presented
against all possible defendants on a typical case of food
product~

liability. this court has an excellent opportunity

to settle the law once and for all in the State of l)tah on
this subject.
It i~ submitted that under the better reasoned and
tllOd<'rn

t rPnd of authority plaintiff is entitled to recover
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against both defendants on all three counts and at the
very least on one or more. For this reason, this court
is urged to reverse the dis1nissals made by the trial court
and to remand this case for trial in accordance with a
clear pronouncement of law by this court.
Respectfully submitted,

RAWLINGS, WALLACE,
ROBERTS & BLACK
JOHN L. BLACK
Counsel for Appellant

530 Judge Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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